promethea.incorporated

brave and steely-eyed and morally pure and a bit terrifying… /testimonials /evil /leet .ask? .ask_long?


And the Bailey affair continues…

Fucking huge extra disclaimer for those incredibly dense people who haven’t picked up on it yet:

I don’t harass people. Not even Bailey. In fact, I think the correct choice for people in such situations is to not harass people; even if some political tit-for-tatting were warranted (most of the time it even isn’t), other people are already doing enough of it (most likely way too much).

But I sometimes don’t condemn people who do, because actively condemning is a choice as well. Rationalists are the discourse equivalent of peacekeepers, and knowing when to intervene, how, and which side benefits from it, is relevant. I won’t waste time and effort rushing to the principled defense of Bailey (although I’d possibly rush to a principled defense of people whose actions are less over the line), as people are doing enough of it already.

@slatestarscratchpad reblogged a previous post of mine with the following commentary:

“Digusting pervert” is your term, not Bailey’s. Bailey said that a phenomenon *has a basis in sexuality*. If you think anybody who does something for sexual reasons is a disgusting pervert, that’s your problem and not his.

And when the public hears “has a basis in sexuality” they will think “disgusting perverts”. Partially because they already think trans women are disgusting perverts to begin with. I find this absurd coming from the person who literally wrote “The Virtue of Silence”. And from the person who wanted people to shut up about NrxaB for PR concerns.

Your idea that he is calling anybody a liar is equally unfounded. One of the most basic ideas of psychology and psychiatry is that people don’t necessarily know their own minds. Sometimes this can become very complicated. For example, some people have pseudoseizures - seizures which are not caused by epilepsy, which occur at moments when they need to get out of a situation quickly, and which are what most people would consider “fake” - but most neurologists believe this is not conscious dissembling but the subconscious mind responding to stress in the best way it knows how.

A lot of science involves attributing behavior to people who might not approve of those attributions. For example, many people claim that homophobes are secretly gay. The evidence for this is currently mixed. I assume some homophobes are angry about this - should they be able to harass, doxx, and try to fire the scientists who think this? Some people use Implicit Association Tests to show that lots of people who don’t think they’re racist are actually racist; these tests have recently been found to be sketchy. Should all the scientists who supported them be killed? Or should we just turn their lives into a living hell? Why even have psychology at this point?

Bailey’s book is not virtuous science. It’s politics. It’s a deliberate attempt to push an idea to the mainstream, not via the usual procedures which have institutional restraints on them, but by specifically routing around those restraints.

I’ll just quote the book a bit:

Heterosexual men who want to be women are not naturally feminine; there is no sense in which they have women’s souls. What they do have is fascinating, but even they have rarely discussed it openly. One cannot understand transsexualism without studying transsexuals’ sexuality. Transsexuals lead remarkable sex lives. Those who love men become women to attract them. Those who love women become the women they love. Although transsexuals are cultural hot commodities right now, writers have been either too shallow or too squeamish to give transsexual sexuality the attention it deserves. No longer.

Most people—even those who have never met a transsexual— know the standard story of men who want to be women: “Since I can remember, I have always felt as if I were a member of the other sex. I have felt like a freak with this body and detest my penis. I must get sex reassignment surgery (a “sex change operation”) in order to match my external body with my internal mind.” But the truth is much more interesting than the standard story

Two different types of men change their sex. To anyone who examines them closely, they are quite dissimilar, in their histories, their motivations, their degree of femininity, their demographics, and even the way they look.

To anyone who has seen members of both types and who has learned to ask the right kinds of questions, it is easy to tell them apart.

The most interesting reason why most people do not realize that there are two types of transsexuals is that members of one type sometimes misrepresent themselves as members of the other. I will get more specific later, but for now, it is enough to say that they are often silent about their true motivation and instead tell stories about themselves that are misleading and, in important respects, false.

The two types of transsexuals who begin life as males are called homosexual and autogynephilic. Once understood, these names are appropriate. Succinctly put, homosexual male-to-female transsexuals are extremely feminine gay men, and autogynephilic transsexuals are men erotically obsessed with the image of themselves as women.

Although some elements of Cher’s story are very common to this kind of transsexual (especially the erotic cross-dressing), others (such as the wearing of fake vaginas) are unique to her. At least I have never met other transsexuals who admitted to this. Nevertheless, I think that Cher is a wonderful example of the second kind of transsexualism, less because she is representative than because she openly and floridly exemplifies the essential feature of this type, which is autogynephilia

In my experience, most laypeople are happy to accept the “I’m a woman in a man’s body” narrative, and don’t really want to know about autogynephilia—even though the preferred narrative is misleading and it is impossible to understand nonhomosexual transsexualism without autogynephilia. When I have tried to educate journalists who have called me as an expert on transsexualism, they have reacted uncomfortably. One said: “We just can’t put that into a family newspaper.” Perhaps not, but then they can’t print the truth.

There is one more reason why many autogynephiles provide misleading information about themselves that is different than outright lying. It has to do with obsession. Something about autogynephilia creates a need not only to enact a feminine self, but also to actually believe in her

True acceptance of the transgendered requires that we truly understand who they are.

According to this narrative, transsexuals want to change their sex because their sense of self disagrees with their bodies, not because they have any unusual sexual preferences that depend on a sex change. While the first part of this explanation sometimes may be true, the latter is not. It should be clear by now that the “gender, not sex” part of the transsexual narrative is false for autogynephiles

I have devised a set of rules that should work even for the novice (though admittedly, I have not tested them). Start at zero. Ask each question, and if the answer is “Yes,” add the number (+1 or -1) next to the question. If the sum gets to +3, stop; the transsexual you’re talking to is autogynephilic. If the sum gets to -3, she is homosexual.

This isn’t science. This is politics. This is condescending bullshit from someone who thinks he’s “helping” and, thanks to his high status in society, can get away with it without regard for the consequences he’s causing. And the scientific parts are bad and certainly do not warrant such a confident presentation in the form of a confused amateur ethnography. Even when accounting for the fact that this was written 10 years ago. For example, did nobody think to check cis women for autogynephilia too, to check on whether they’re actually picking up just regular common female sexuality instead of some “paraphilia”? Or maybe consider the fact that trans women exist outside gay bars and support groups, and that the ones found in those might not be representative of the whole population?

Even if I disregard all this “women are men” stuff and focus on the object-level claims instead of shibboleths, this has “bullshit alert” scrawled all over it. When you claim people are obsessed with something, that they are lying to themselves and everyone else, that they sort really neatly into two categories, etc. you better have some really solid evidence and most importantly you need to show that you understand the alternative claims and are actually able to rule them out with sufficient confidence. And when you sort neatly, it introduces another level of irresponsibility because this stuff seldom works that way so you need to overcome an extra amount of prior skepticism. TMWWBQ did not demonstrate any of this.

Those people are getting away with terrible science because of the differential positions of trans people vs. academicians. It’s brutal, cynical status psychology. (Of course, Bailey isn’t thinking that he’s consciously doing a hack job, he just doesn’t feel the need to test his theories properly because there was no pressure to be scrupulous when dealing with trans people because people got away with all kinds of unbelievable bullshit.)

Many people claim that homophobes are secretly gay. And it’s one thing to do science and write something like “I observed a correlation with homophobic attitudes and signs of arousal from homoerotic material” and a completely different thing to write a book titled ‘The Man Who Hates His Sexuality: Why All People Who Dislike Homosexuals Are Secretly Gay’. Current evidence doesn’t warrant writing the latter, and if someone did it and it became really popular and widely accepted I’d consider it a big problem in the world and would express my disapproval in suitable contexts and be very understanding of why some people would react with nastiness. If you engage in outright memetic warfare, don’t complain if memetic warfare engages you.

I think Bailey’s theories are likely false, but science is full of false theories. The whole point of science is that we expect there to be dozens of false theories for every correct one, and the correct one will eventually win out. If everybody who proposes a false theory gets harassed, science can’t progress - and I’m sure that your harassers will be *super diligent* in making sure they only firebomb the homes of scientists whose theory is *genuinely false*.

And if you think anybody who attributes a phenomenon to something you don’t like deserves to be hurt and harassed, I think you’ve excluded yourself from the category of people who can discuss things maturely, and that any community that cares about epistemic integrity needs to exclude you for their own safety - not just the safety of their truth-orientation, but for the physical safety of their members. I think this is a super super super basic rule and I am surprised we cannot manage it.

I think there’s a significant confusion here. First of all, I’m not advocating firebombing anyone (Except the publishers of ‘The Nihilist’s Cookbook’ because when the entire human race is on the line I don’t give a shit. So people better not publish amateur-accessible guides to creating apocalyptic bioweapons.). And I’m not advocating that anyone should personally engage in this kind of activism on the margin, because what the world needs is less of it, not more. All I’m saying is that in a sufficiently shitty situation a thing that would otherwise be really shitty might be the least shitty option available, and that I cannot say with confidence that the world would’ve been a better place if Bailey hadn’t been reacted to with nastiness.

Obviously we’d all be better off in a world without nastiness.

And refraining from nastiness even when nastiness seems like a good idea is pragmatically a pretty good universal heuristic.

But in this utterly broken world there may be specific situations where some group engaging in nastiness would result in better outcomes than them abstaining from nastiness, even when accounting for the allure of the dark side. It would be highly suspicious that there would never ever be such a case, because nastiness is most closest analogous to violence and there are cases where violence is obviously the best answer.

And to continue the analogy, just because I recognize that violence is sometimes the least worst option doesn’t mean that in practice anyone would need to fear for their safety near me, because it’s effectively impossible that such a situation would actually arise in civil interaction between people who treat each other like people (self-defense being the most obvious candidate, which doesn’t have a clear equivalent on the nastiness side because nastiness is a lot more difficult to precisely define; but if you write a mean misrepresenting book about my ingroup, I’m going to write a mean misrepresenting book review about it).

But I can easily see ways by which nastiness could be used to improve the world. For example, if there was a sufficiently coordinated source of nastiness that could reliably retaliate against those who initiate nastiness without excessive bias in favor of specific sides, it might act to reduce the total nastiness. If doxxers got doxxed, if death-threaters got threatened, harassers harassed etc., we’d probably see less doxxing, threats and harassment. (In practice this is difficult because the smart ones always do it anon)

And when one looks at responses such as this one, the comparison to firebombing is even more baffling. Is James being nasty? Yes, absolutely. Is it an unwarranted level of nastiness?  I can’t say so. It illuminates the way people experienced Bailey’s book, and some of the objections that didn’t get to academia because we don’t have access to academia. Such neat typologies are incredibly prone to confirmation bias. Bailey’s sample was ridiculously biased. Blanchard’s institution is notorious for abusiveness. Garbage in, garbage out, and in a better world TMWWBQ would’ve been dismissed as the trivial hack job it was, based on shitty interpretation of shitty data, but we don’t live in that better world and the book is a representative of a wider incredibly shitty trend where cis academicians talk over trans people, erasing all the inconvenient ones in pursuit of their pet theories, and systematically get away with it. And we pay the price, sometimes with our lives.

There’s a massive institutional failure here, and I can’t say that flawless politeness would necessarily be the best option. It would be nice if it was, but there’s a certain suspicious convenience to that idea. I have seen way too much of the phenomenon where polite objections get dismissed and ignored, and only anger gets people to notice that maybe there’s a problem (people are clockwork, and respond to emotional appeals differently than to abstract arguments, news at eleven), to believe that complete politeness by everyone would always be the best way to achieve things. (And once the angry ones have stretched the overton window, the polite ones suddenly appear reasonable and make compromises and everyone credits the polite ones when in reality it’s the nature of the “good cop, bad cop” game which got stuff done. Yes, I’m cynical, but my background is that of a politician, not an academician, and I find it a mistake to assume that the rules of academical ingroup civility would automatically be the most effective ones everywhere. Just like it would be a mistake to assume the rules of effective politics would be conductive for effective truthseeking. But effective truthseeking doesn’t happen in the arena and style TMWWBQ was made for and in.)

Against that backdrop, I can’t consider a nasty article to be a massive sin.

(And to make it clear, writing nasty articles and trying to get someone discredited is the type of nastiness I’m talking about, not doxxing or threats, because there’s a chance that this might’ve been missed by the illusion of transparency. (This is going to be really embarrassing if it all ends up having been about that one.))

2 weeks ago · tagged #discourse cw #nastiness cw · 12 notes · .permalink


brazenautomaton:

ursaeinsilviscacant:

nostalgebraist:

Another post on Galileo’s Middle Finger, having finally finished the book.  (Previous posts: Maria New and prenatal dex, also various posts in the tag #michael bailey cw?)

Galileo’s Middle Finger (hereafter GMF) is a strange book.  On one level, the book’s content is pretty easy to make sense of: Alice Dreger has been involved in a number of dramatic academic controversies over the course of her career, and she figured (sensibly enough) that people might enjoy reading a book that retells these stories.  To some extent, she just presents the book as “a memoir of the controversies I’ve been involved in.”

However, she also claims that these stories are connected by an overarching theme, which is something like this:

“Scientists and activists often find themselves at odds, on opposite sides of angry battles.  But everyone should recognize that truth and justice are intimately connected: you can’t help the victims of injustice if you don’t care about the facts of the situation, and if you’re in a unique position to explore facts (such as an academic job), you ought to steer your investigations toward the social good – not by sacrificing the truth, but by looking for the truths that can help.  Activists need to be more concerned with truth, and scientists need to be more concerned with justice.  And if both sides followed this advice, they would be at odds far less often.”

All of this sounds very agreeable to me; I think I already more-or-less agreed with it before I read Dreger’s book.  But do Dreger’s accounts of various controversies actually serve as useful examples of this stuff?  Not always.  And Dreger’s attempts to link everything back to her theme produce some awkward results.


Besides a few minor subplots, there are three controversies narrated in GMF.  First, she narrates the controversy over Michael Bailey’s book The Man Who Would Be Queen.  Second, the controversy over Patrick Tierney’s book Darkness in El Dorado, which accused anthropologist Napoleon Chagnon of genocide as well as various other wrongdoings.  Third, Dreger’s investigations into Maria New and her struggles to get her criticisms recognized by government bodies and the public.

Of these three, it’s the Tierney/Chagnon case that most directly fits Dreger’s theme.  Tierney’s book was a work of shoddy hack journalism which made spectacular allegations that have been uniformly refuted by later investigators.  (N.B. Tierney made many allegations, and some of the more minor ones have been less clearly refuted, but those weren’t the ones that made headlines.)  Nonetheless, shortly after the book came out, the American Anthropological Association quickly endorsed Tierney’s book – the academic equivalent of reflexively believing a callout post without checking the sources.

Reading this in terms of Dreger’s theme seems straightforward: in its concern for justice, the AAA neglected the value of truth, and thus failed to even serve justice.

Even here, though, the theme strains a bit.  The Tierney debacle was not exactly a conflict between “activists” and “academics”; the people under-valuing truth in the service of justice were the academics of the AAA.  (Tierney could arguably be called an “activist,” but Dreger treats him – rightly, it seems to me – as a hack journalist from whom more concern for the truth cannot be expected.)

The Maria New story also lacks a clear instance of an activist failing to sufficiently value truth.  In that story, Dreger is the activist, raising ethical concerns from the outside about an established academic, and her activism is directly grounded in science that she believes that academic is ignoring.  She may intend this as an example of “activism done right” (about which more later), and/or as a case of an academic caring too little about justice.  But it’s not as though New is ignoring justice because truth is her only value; as Dreger notes, her prenatal dex work has produced little in the way of academic knowledge.  So again, it’s hard to see this as an illustration of the theme.

So far, it looks like Dreger has failed to exhibit an example of activists behaving badly, although this is crucial to her theme.  The third story (well, first as presented in the book), about Michael Bailey, is her main (and only) example of this.  But of the three stories, it’s that one that fits the theme least well.

Dreger’s account of the Bailey controversy shares a quality with her account of the Chagnon controversy: both are told as stories of lovable and humane, if out-of-touch, researchers being persecuted by ignorant people who don’t understand them.  Dreger spends a great deal of text talking about how much she personally likes Bailey and Chagnon – Bailey is a personal friend, Chagnon she met while investigating that controversy.  As “characters” in the book, they downright glow.  They’re funny, they’re good company, they both have cute and harmonious marriages.

It makes sense to write stuff like this in order to humanize people who have been demonized by others.  But one has to note here that none of this bears on the “truth” side of the things.  It’s certainly possible for someone to have committed genocide and still be a warm and sparkling conversationalist at the dinner table; it’s possible for Michael Bailey to be a great guy if you know him personally, and nonetheless to have been wrong about trans women.

With Chagnon, this tension never becomes relevant, because as a matter of simple fact, Chagnon was exonerated by multiple serious investigators.  With Bailey, the tension is glaringly relevant, because the issue of whether Bailey is actually right never gets fully addressed in Dreger’s treatment.  Indeed, she treats it almost as an irrelevant side issue.  Where is the value of truth here?

To be fair, Dreger does put her beliefs on the table about the issue.  But these beliefs seem to reveal little serious interest in the questions involved.  She seems to have uncritically bought the Blanchard-Bailey line – possibly because she only cares about these issues insofar as they affect her good friend Michael Bailey? – and to have done little investigation into academic work on transgender beyond this.

Astonishingly, for instance, the phrase “gender dysphoria” never appears in GMF at all.  (A word-search for “dysphoria” turns up only one result, in the title of a Blanchard paper cited in the endnotes.)  When Dreger presents her account of trans women, she talks about (for instance) transitioning as a choice made by feminine gay men in order to better fit into homophobic social environments, stressing that these people might not have transitioned if feminine gay identities were more accepted in their local environments.  I’m willing to believe this happens sometimes – but Dreger seems to actually not know that gender dysphoria is a thing.  This is in a book published in 2015.  One wonders if she’s ever even looked up the condition in the DSM (which changed the name from “Gender Identity Disorder” to “Gender Dysphoria” in the 2013 DSM-V, but even before that had included dysphoria as one of the two major diagnostic criteria).

Dreger has a page on her website, written after GMF was published, in which she responds to questions about “autogynephilia” and states her current positions.  Again, she never mentions gender dysphoria.  Of Blanchard’s androphilic/autogynephilic typology, she says that “I think what I’ve seen from the scientific clinical literature and socioculturally suggests this division makes sense.”  She does not provide any citations, and does not address critiques (see here) that the data show a continuum which does not separate well into two clusters.

I belabor all of this because Dreger’s indifference to the truth here simply makes GMF fundamentally incoherent.  I agree with Dreger’s theme; I have no clue how she thinks the Bailey story illustrates it.


But wait – Dreger’s claim is that activists value truth too little in their quests for justice.  Does this hold true for the activists who attacked Michael Bailey?

Again, Dreger seems to not much care.  She devotes a lot of space to the claims made by these activists, but mostly to express confusion over them.  Noting that some of them display what look to her like signs of autogynephilia, she scratches her head: why are they angry at a book for talking about autogynephilia?  One would think that someone in Dreger’s position – someone interested in getting to the bottom of situations where truth and justice appear to conflict – ought to answer a question like this.  Dreger doesn’t.  Her attitude is basically: “who are these weird people attacking my friend Michael?  What do they want?  They’re so confusing!  Michael is a scientist, so maybe they don’t like science?  Jeez, who knows!!!”

What she substitutes for consideration of these issues – and let me be clear, this is not nothing – is a detailed, blow-by-blow account of the nasty, dishonest ways in which the activists tried to ruin Michael Bailey’s reputation.  They were, in fact, really nasty.  But people don’t just do things like that for no reason.  What about the larger questions of truth and justice here?  Why do these activists believe Michael Bailey is so harmful?  Could it be the case that Bailey is harmful, to the point that defaming him is a net good?

Dreger never mentions this sort of idea, but it hangs uncomfortably over her whole book.  She bemoans the fact that her work on Maria New – which is generally polite and non-nasty, if very harsh on New – has failed to make appreciable waves in the world, beyond loading the first page of Google results with dex-critical pages.  On the other hand, Bailey’s book is now solely known as the subject of a stormy controversy, which received huge amounts of media discussion.  What if nasty activism is sometimes necessary to get the job done?  What if simply having both truth and justice on your side isn’t enough?  And, putting it the other way around, how can Dreger assume that the anti-Bailey crowd didn’t have truth and justice on its side, just because they were nasty and vicious to her friend?

In Dreger’s telling, Andrea James is a scary asshole who sends her possibly-physical threats via email, and Michael Bailey and Napoleon Chagnon are precious cinnamon rolls.  But fighting for truth-and-justice is not the same as identifying the Nice People and the Mean People.  These may in fact be (I hate to say it) largely unrelated endeavors.

A serious book about activism, science, truth and justice would begin with these disquieting possibilities, and then explore from there.  (One example that book might look at: Dreger’s earlier non-nasty activism for intersex people has gotten stuff done.)  Dreger’s book instead stays in an overly cozy universe, where “fighting for good” and “defending her lovable buddies against the bad meanies” can never be conflicting goals.

“What if nasty activism is sometimes necessary to get the job done?  What if simply having both truth and justice on your side isn’t enough?”

I really want more serious treatment of this question from someone sensible. Obviously I really hope the answer is no, and I am tired of discourse from people who seem like they would actively prefer the answer to be yes (although maybe it’s only my bias making them seem that way.) But yeah, doe anyone know of any decent book-length discussions of the issue which look at real-life situations?

The answer is no because the moment you decide that nasty activism is necessary to get the job done you completely lose the capacity to distinguish “cases when nasty activism is a distasteful necessity” from “cases where nasty activism can be used to punish people for saying things that make me upset, or just for the crime of being unpopular and perceptible to me.”

This is proving too much. If one contrasts nasty activism to violence, one could say the exact same thing, and to some degree it’s quite true (PoliceMob being a very good example of insufficiently restrained violence, contrast with BadSJMob), but the actually correct answer would probably be “it’s possible to use it usefully, but most of the time it’s a bad idea and completely abstaining from it is way less likely to be harmful than using it indiscriminately”.

TL;DR and a fucking massive disclaimer to not get this misunderstood and misrepresented by everyone: I think most nastiness is excessive and unwarranted, but consider it at least possibly excusable in some situations where people are reacting to sufficiently shitty things, and Bailey is up there in the list of “those few cases where nastiness and extremism might be okay”, along with the likes of Judge Rotenberg Centre etc.; and it’s really shitty that if I say “Bailey is terrible, scorn him”, some asshole somewhere will take it as endorsement of heaping abuse on some kid whose only crime was not being up to date with their shibboleths.

(descriptions of dirty tricks, nasty sj, and other dark underbelly-of-the-world things below the cut)

Keep reading

2 weeks ago · tagged #nastiness cw #transmisogyny cw #cissexism cw #suicide cw #the best heuristic for oppressed people since sharp stick time · 54 notes · source: nostalgebraist · .permalink