cancer, and the pleasure of the weed
Okay, can someone ELI5 why I’m supposed to pick “the pleasure of the weed” here?
Like, this isn’t some abstract theoretical toy, this Smoking Lesion, or as it would be better called, Exercise Genetics problem is actually a thing in my IRL
It has probabilistic Azathoth instead of absolute Omega, and I may be able to peek into the boxes before selecting thanks to modern technology, but even then it would seem that me being the sort of clockwork thing that has the property “one-boxes” would make me likely to be the sort of a clockwork thing that has the property “gets a million dollars” and being the sort of a clockwork thing that has the property “one-boxes even if the box turns out to be empty when peeking into it” would make it extra-likely?
Thus, I should be the sort of a person who likes exercise so I’d have the genes that make one like exercise and live long, even if I turn out to not have such genes, because the sort of a person who has good genes would make such a choice?
Then again, turning it the other way around into the Psychosis Weed problem (people with early psychosis are more likely to self-medicate) doesn’t make me interested in impacting my choice on whether or not to choose “the pleasure of the weed” to avoid psychosis-related genes retroactively.
One could argue that the question is different because self-medicating is caused by symptoms and thus choosing to have symptoms or not (yeah, good luck with that) would be the thing that matters while the choice to exercise is directly controlled by the exact neurochemistry the Exercise Genes are about, and I think that one is probably “the” reason for it. So using that logic I’d determine my choice in the Smoking Lesion based on the mechanism of action of the lesion.
On the other hand, it could be that I’m supposed to choose not exercising and I just inherently enjoy exercise because I have the good genes that make me live long and prosper and thus my neurochemistry is motivated to interpret the Exercise Genetics that way?
Because it is pleasure. Why would you not pick pleasure.
If being the sort of a person who picks that specific pleasure means I’m the sort of a person who gets cancer, then I don’t want to be the sort of a person who picks that specific pleasure.
If you have the desire, you have the unfortunate gene, no matter whether you give in or not.
But the question is determining whether or not I have the desire, as it’s not unambiguous. As a neurochemical process, my choice to engage in exercise is not separable from the desire to engage in exercise but rather a manifestation of it, thus in the absence of obvious markers that would establish the causal connection I don’t know what exactly my genotype is; but if I act in accordance with the choices that would be made by someone with the favorable genes, I’d expect it to be a manifestation of better chances of having received the favorable genes in the first place, as I would be less likely to have made such a choice if my genes were unfavorable.
(via shieldfoss)
1 month ago · 89 notes · source: nostalgebraist · .permalink
internetangstar liked this
losemywheels reblogged this from ultraleftist
ultraleftist reblogged this from nostalgebraist
eternalsailordianamon liked this
carovingian liked this
yadorans reblogged this from nostalgebraist
regurgitationzone liked this
shxttea reblogged this from tittybigfootdakimakura
shieldfoss reblogged this from socialjusticemunchkin and added:1: Yes, the weak form has the same weaknesses. Short version: Evidentiary decision theory relies on agents who do not...
tittybigfootdakimakura reblogged this from gynoidwren
tittybigfootdakimakura liked this
sigmaleph reblogged this from mugasofer and added:This does not change my argument? You could have a gene that reshapes your decision algorithm in a particular way, true....
lethriloth liked this
cythereancutie liked this
mugasofer reblogged this from sigmaleph and added:The trouble is, it’s possible - not certain, but possible - that the gene makes you...
ghostofasecretary liked this
illidanstr liked this
anaisnein reblogged this from shieldfoss and added:Did I let the premise slip? Whoops. As you were.
ilzolende liked this
nothingismoral said: so how does this relate to the “boxing” thought experiment?
nothingismoral liked this
anaisnein liked this
rusalkii reblogged this from socialjusticemunchkin and added:If all people with brown hair were predisposed to Browningitis, I could dye my hair any color I wanted and it wouldn’t...
nothingismoral reblogged this from socialjusticemunchkin and added:but now you’re the sort of person who would pick that pleasure if not for the thought that the sort of person who picks...
woodswordsquire liked this
satisfizzier liked this
nostalgebraist said: i think this is where the IRL analogues diverge from the formal problem. the formal problem assumes that “the desire” is a clear, given, yes/no thing, as though it’s like having some weird fetish: either it definitely appeals to you, or it definitely doesn’t. with something like exercise where “determining whether you have the desire” is itself a psychological process that you have some control over, the formal structure no longer applies.
eka-mark liked this
umblrgumblr reblogged this from nostalgebraist and added:#googling around for newcomb/cdt papers just now was fun#you know what is an actual technical term in that...
moderatelypricedsponges liked this
gynoidwren reblogged this from crimid
gynoidwren liked this
crimid reblogged this from zanna-sara
jhermann liked this
akaltynarchitectonica liked this
nostalgebraist posted this- Show more notes